北大经院工作坊第438场
Compensation for Teamwork and Professional Networks: Evidence from Research Economists
劳动-健康经济学工作坊
主讲人：
Kevin Devereux （北京大学经济学院助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）石菊、（北大国发院）张丹丹
参与老师：
（北大经院）秦雪征、王耀璟、袁野
（北大国发院）赵耀辉、李玲、刘国恩、雷晓燕、易君健
时间：
2022年3月23日（周三）
10：00-11：30
地点：
北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园246教室
主讲人简介：
Kevin Devereux is a Canadian empirical labor and health economist who completed his doctorate at the University of Toronto. His main strand of research focuses on the interaction between teamwork, productivity, and compensation, with applications using novel datasets resembling personnel records. He typically assembles these datasets using web scraping. He also studies employer power in labor markets, healthcare spending dynamics, firm responses to tax shocks, and gender discrimination.
摘要：
Workers in developed economies are increasingly compensated according to team output, but parsing individual contributions to teamwork can be difficult. I estimate productivity and its relationship to pay among academic economists, whose main outputs -- research papers -- list contributing authors. I use coauthor turnover to identify author value-added: an author's average output quality conditional on the value-added of coauthors. Linking the universe of scholarly economic research to publicly available payroll records, I study the effect of value-added on salaries. Strikingly, coauthors' value-added has a greater effect on own salary than does own value-added, suggesting the value of professional networks dominates the effect of discounting contributions based on coauthor quality. Moreover, authors are compensated for the solo-authored output of their coauthors -- which cannot be reasonably attributed to them -- demonstrating the value of professional networks.
北大经院工作坊第439场
Do Firms Set Pension Discount Rates Strategically?
风险、保险与不确定性经济学工作坊
主讲人：
Tong Yu（虞彤，辛辛那提大学教授）
主持人：
（北大经院）贾若、（人大财金）陈泽、（清华经管）刁莉
参与老师：
（北大经院）郑伟、（清华经管）陈秉正、（人大财金）魏丽 等
时间：
2022年3月24日（周四）
9：00-10：30
形式：
腾讯会议
会议号：224-766-857
会议密码：220321
主讲人简介:
Tong Yu is the Virgil M. Schwarm Professor of Finance in the Lindner School of Business at the University of Cincinnati. His teaching and research interests are on asset pricing, fintech, and financial risk management. He published works in academic journals such as the Journal of Financial Economics, Management Science, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of Risk and Insurance. Professor Yu received the Early Career Scholastic Achievement Award from the American Risk and Insurance Association in 2011 and he founded the China International Risk Forum in 2015.
摘要：
Firms can reduce the magnitude of pension contributions through the choices of pension liability discount rates. We find firms do so asymmetrically: they are slow to lower the rates when corporate bond rates drop, but raise them rapidly when rates rise. We present evidence that financially distressed firms set pension discount rates higher than do healthy firms. At the same time, we find that firms setting high pension discount rates are better funded and they are more profitable. For financially healthy firms, there is a strong positive relationship between investment productivity and pension discount rates, but this is not the case for distressed firms. Overall, the imperfect elasticity of pension discount rates to market interest rates offers firms leeway to alleviate the constraints from defined benefit pension plans.
北大经院工作坊第440场
通过机器学习方法揭示玩家如何选择混合策略
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：
Michihiro Kandori (Professor, University of Tokyo)
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）汪浩、胡岠
时间：
2022年3月24日（周四）
10：30-12：00
形式：
ZOOM会议
会议号：830 0424 9904
会议密码：607650
主讲人简介：
1989 Ph. D, Stanford University
1989 Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania
1990 Assistant Professor, Princeton University
1992 Associate Professor, University of Tokyo
1999 Professor, University of Tokyo
Michihiro Kandori is known for his pioneering contributions to the theory of repeated games and evolutionary game theory. He is Fellow of Econometric Society and currently Executive Vice President of Game Theory Society.
摘要：
How do people learn to play a mixed strategy equilibrium? We analyze this issue in a large data set where more than 5,000 subjects played a game that has a highly non-trivial mixed strategy equilibrium. We employed some machine learning models to fit the data and found that some of them substantially improve upon a leading behavioral model of learning. We also examine what kind of insights can be gained from the estimated machine learning models.
北大经院工作坊第441场
Large Families and Lasting Prosperity: Intergenerational Transmission of Fertility and Human Capital in Chinese Families, 1350-1920.
经济史工作坊
主讲人：
Sijie Hu (Renmin University of China)
主持老师：
（北大经院）赵一泠
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色
（北大国发院）席天扬、于航
时间：
2022年3月24日（周四）
12：00-13：30
形式：
线下：北大科技园A座二层201室（海淀区中关村北大街127-1）
线上：腾讯会议
会议号：665 308 410
主讲人简介：
Sijie Hu is an Assistant Professor of Economic History at School of Economics, Renmin University of China. Hu’s primary research interests are in Chinese economic history, historical demography, and population history. Her recent research covers topics including lineage organization, human capital formation, social mobility, and female infanticide in late imperial China. Her research titled “Survival of the Confucians: Social Status and Fertility in China, 1400-1900” has won the Best Research Paper Prize of the 7th International Symposium on Quantitative History. She has also served as a referee for journals including Journal of Economic History and Economic History Review. Hu holds a PhD in Economic History from London School of Economics and Political Science, an MSc and a BA from Renmin University of China.
摘要：
This paper uses the genealogical records of 36,456 males to demonstrate the continuity of family prosperity in imperial China by investigating the intergenerational transmission of fertility and human capital in six Chinese lineages from 1350 to 1920. I first test for a Darwinian trade-off between reproduction and long-run survival in the six lineages. The empirical results suggest an absence of a significant Darwinian trade-off. The possible optimal level of net reproduction for long-run reproductive success was seven sons, which was above the sample median of two sons. I then examine the mechanisms through which reproduction affected the long-run survival by analysing the presence of the child quantity-quality trade-off, the relationship between fathers’ fertility and three types of quality in sons: whether they could get married, whether they were literate, and whether they obtained an academic degree. Because that the practice of offering sons for adoption induced a random variation in family size, I instrument family size with the adoption practice. Both the logistic and the IV estimates suggest that a significant Beckerian trade-off was absent. It was not family size so much as father’s human capital that was of the central importance in affecting a son’s quality.
北大经院工作坊第442场
Nature and Economics: Demystifying publishing economics paper in Nature journals
生态、环境与气候经济学工作坊
主讲人：
夏玚（自然杂志高级学术编辑）
主持老师：
（北大经院）季曦
参与老师：
（北大经院）章政、张博、李虹、张鹏飞、刘政文、梁远宁
（北大国发院）徐晋涛、王敏、邢剑炜、易媛媛
（北大现代农学院）刘承芳、侯玲玲、解伟、王悦
时间：
2022年3月25日（周五）
10:00-12:00
形式：
线上报名参会。请扫描二维码进行报名。讲座将通过腾讯会议线上方式进行，名额有限，先到先得。报名成功者，将于3月24日收到确认消息及腾讯会议号等信息。
主讲人简介：
夏玚，英国东安吉利亚大学生态经济学博士，现任自然杂志高级学术编辑，2017-2020曾任自然通讯高级学术编辑。作为两本期刊唯一的社会科学编辑，主要负责社会经济，环境政策，健康风险，气候变化以及可持续发展的相关稿件审核。十年留英经历，致力于自然灾害-健康风险-社会经济影响的多学科交叉研究，曾发表多篇高影响因子SCI论文。
摘要：
•Demystifying Nature journals and Economics in Nature journals
•Preparing your manuscript
•Submitting your manuscript
•Post-submission affairs
•Others
北大经院工作坊第443场
调预期、防风险：央行金融稳定沟通效果研究
计量、金融和大数据分析工作坊
主讲人：
姜富伟（中央财经大学教授）
主持老师：
（北大国发院）黄卓
参与老师：
（北大经院）王一鸣、王熙、刘蕴霆
（北大国发院）沈艳、张俊妮、孙振庭
（北大新结构）胡博
时间：
2022年3月25日（周五）
10:00-11:30
地点：
北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园245教室
主讲人简介：
姜富伟，中央财经大学教授、博导，金融工程系主任，教育部青年长江学者，研究领域包括资产定价、行为金融、金融科技等，在经济金融顶级期刊Journal of Financial Economics、Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、《管理世界》、《管理科学学报》、《金融研究》、《经济学季刊》等发表论文30余篇，成果被评为ESI全球前1%最高被引论文、RFS最高被引论文，主持的国家自然科学基金项目被评为特优，并被《哈佛商业评论》、《清华金融评论》等转载应用，荣获《金融研究》优秀论文奖、亚洲金融协会最佳论文奖、国际财务管理协会最佳论文奖等诸多学术奖励。担任SSCI来源期刊Accounting and Finance副主编、Annals of Economics and Finance编委和Management Science等30多本中英文学术期刊评审。
摘要：
在“双支柱”调控框架下，金融稳定成为与经济稳定并重的政策目标。本文基于文本分析技术研究了央行金融稳定沟通在金融市场上的效果，以考察金融稳定沟通是否有助于实现金融稳定目标。本文借鉴了前沿的英文金融稳定词典，同时结合Word2Vec算法和人工复核筛选的方式构建了一款金融稳定词典，并基于该词典提取了金融稳定沟通文本的情绪信息。随后本文采用事件研究法发现金融稳定沟通能够引导市场预期并降低市场风险，证明金融稳定沟通有助于维护金融稳定。进一步的异质性分析表明，金融稳定沟通的前瞻性内容和宏观审慎管理内容对市场的影响更强，表明这些内容创造了新信息，而市场主要对这类增量信息做出反应。最后，本文发现金融稳定情绪可以引导投资者形成理性预期（信号渠道），同时减少投资者信念异质性（协同渠道），从而解释了金融稳定沟通的作用机制。本文构建的金融稳定词典填补了国内该领域研究的空白，同时本文结论对于央行如何使用金融稳定沟通调控预期和防范风险具有重要的理论和现实意义。
北大经院工作坊第444场
The Return of Greenspan: Mumbling with Great Incoherence（格林斯潘的回归：有噪音的信息）
宏观经济学工作坊
主讲人：
欧声亮（上海财经大学高等研究院助理教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）李博
参与老师：
（北大国发院）赵波、余昌华、李明浩
（北大经院）陈仪、韩晗、李伦
时间：
2022年3月25日（周五）
10：00-11：30
形式：
ZOOM 会议
会议号：815 6467 4921
会议密码：307503
主讲人简介：
欧声亮，上海财经大学高等研究院助理教授，博士毕业于庞培法布拉大学，主要研究领域为宏观经济学与货币经济学，研究成果发表在Journal of Monetary Economics等学术期刊，主持国家自然科学基金等研究项目
摘要：
The conventional wisdom views a reduced aggregate noise as welfare improving. This paper demonstrates that increased transparency regarding the unobserved state of the economy might reduce social welfare due to the presence of nominal rigidity, which gives rise to costly price dispersions. On the one hand, business cycle fluctuations and price dispersions arising from nominal rigidity are muted in a noisy economy. On the other hand, an economy with less transparency suffers from efficiency losses due to inefficient coordination in production and pricing decisions. The optimal central bank communication balances the gain from increased efficiency with the cost of higher price dispersions due to nominal rigidity. Monetary policy affects the tradeoff, and thus interacts with the communication policy. We characterize the conditions under which a more transparent central bank communication reduces social welfare. A dynamic quantitative model demonstrates that a central bank that mumbles with great incoherence is optimal.
北大经院工作坊第445场
The Optimal Trade Policy under Oligopolistic Competition: An Investigation of China’s Automobile Industry
国际经济学与实证产业组织工作坊
主讲人：
王永进（南开大学经济学院教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）莫家伟
参与老师：
（北大经院）杨汝岱、田巍、刘政文、吴群锋
（北大新结构）王歆、徐铭梽
时间：
2022年3月25日（周五）
10：00-11：30
形式：
腾讯会议
会议号：391 314 688
主讲人简介：
王永进，南开大学经济学院，教授，博士生导师，教育部“青年长江学者”，天津市政府特聘研究员，天津市青年拔尖人才和131人才第一层次。主要研究方向为：制度、市场结构与国际贸易；资源配置扭曲与中国经济；数字经济与贸易。在Journal of International Economics, China Economic Review, Economics Letters,《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《经济学季刊》、《世界经济》等期刊发表论文70余篇，担任China and World Economy领域副主编，国家自然科学基金同行评议专家。主持国家自然科学基金项目、参与国家社科和教育部课题多项。出版专著《契约、关系与国际贸易》，《数字经济学》（即将由高等教育出版社出版）。
摘要：
Despite the rising concentration of market structure over the recent decades, oligopoly has fallen out of favor in most of the trade literature. This paper examines the optimal trade policy for China’s automobile industry which features oligopolistic competition. We first estimate the demand function for the automobile, and then compute the optimal tariff for different tariff regimes, namely, uniform tariff, granular tariff and attribute-based trade policy. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that attribute-based trade policy brings the higher social welfare, then followed by uniform tariff, and finally granular tariff.
北大经济史学名家系列讲座第160讲
青藏高原社会经济史浅论
主讲人：
魏明孔（中国社会科学院“登峰战略”资深学科带头人）
时间：
2022年3月25日（周五）
10：00-12：00
形式：
腾讯会议，会议号：402-502-470
主持人：
周建波（北京大学经济学院经济史学系系主任，教授）
评论人：
李曦辉（中央民族大学管理学院院长，教授）
杜常顺（青海师范大学藏区历史与多民族繁荣发展研究省部共建协同创新中心主任，教授）
主讲人简介：
魏明孔，博士，中国社会科学院“登峰战略”资深学科带头人，中国社会科学院大学特聘教授、博士生导师，中国社科院经济所二级研究员、《中国经济史评论》主编。兼任国家社科基金评委、中国经济史学会会长、中国唐史学会副会长、国家出版基金评委等。曾任《中国经济史研究》主编兼社长，中国社科院创新工程首席专家，经济所经济研究室主任。研究成果入选国家哲学社会科学成果文库，获得霍英东青年教师奖等多项奖励。系享受国务院特殊津贴专家。
主办单位：
北京大学经济学院经济史学系
北京大学社会经济史研究所
北京大学外国经济学说研究中心
