北大经院工作坊第701场
Theory and Evidence of Familiarity Bias in Source Preference：Accounting for Home Bias through Laboratory and Field Experiments
行为和实验经济学工作坊
主讲人：Chew Soo Hong 周恕弘（新加坡国立大学、西南财经大学）
主持老师：（北大经院）陆方文
参与老师：
（北大经院）秦雪征、庄晨、曹光宇
（北大光华）孟涓涓、高彧
（北大现代农学院）刘承芳、罗仁福、候玲玲、王悦
（北大教育学院）杨钋、丁延庆、马莉萍、朱琼
时间：2023年9月20日（周三）10：00-12：00
地点：北京大学经济学院302会议室
主讲人简介：
周恕弘教授是新加坡国立大学的荣休教授、西南财经大学中国行为经济与行为金融研究中心特聘主任，计量经济学会院士、经济学理论促进学会（SAET）院士（Fellow），世界著名的实验经济学家和行为经济学家，曾执教于美国亚利桑那大学、约翰·霍普金斯大学、加州大学尔湾分校、香港科技大学。其在经济学以及其他学科顶级权威期刊比如Econometrica，Journal of Political Economy， Review of Economic Studies，Journal of Economic Theory，Neuron，Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences，Management Science等共发表过学术论文六十余篇。
摘要：
Source preference is evident when identically distributed risks from different sources of uncertainty are not valued the same (Heath and Tversky, 1991). This has been axiomatized in Chew and Sagi (2008) and investigated experimentally in several follow up papers including Abdellaoui et al. (2011). Using a trailing digit betting design in four experiments, we identify familiarity bias in source preference as an explanation for home bias in international finance that is distinct from ambiguity aversion or informational advantage. The first two studies establish the existence of a strong familiarity bias within an investment context. A third experiment establishes that standard home bias and familiarity bias are of comparable magnitudes. The last study further demonstrates that home bias can be explained, within subject, by familiarity bias but not by ambiguity aversion. The studies consistently point to familiarity bias as a driver of home bias across investment context and subject types.
北大经院工作坊第702场
Shattering the “Iron Rice Bowl”: Spousal Labor Supply Response to SOE Reform in China
经院-全健院
“健康与劳动经济学”工作坊
主讲人：谭娅 (对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院助理教授)
主持老师：（北大经院）庄晨
参与老师：
（北大全健院）刘国恩、吕蓓妮、潘聿航、林昊翔、孙宇、杨佳楠
（北大经院）秦雪征、石菊、姚奕、王耀璟、袁野、梁远宁
（北大马院）封世蓝
（外经贸保险学院）张帆
时间：2023年9月20日（周三）10：00-11：30
地点：北京大学经济学院107会议室
主讲人简介：
谭娅，现任对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院助理教授，硕士生导师，金砖国家研究中心研究员。2016年博士毕业于北京大学光华管理学院国民经济学专业，2018-2020年作为博雅博士后在北京大学进行科研工作。主要研究领域为区域与城市经济学、公共经济学。在Journal of Urban Economics, iScience，Journal of Cleaner Production,《金融研究》，《经济学(季刊)》、《世界经济》等国内外期刊发表论文20余篇。主持2022年度国家自然科学基金青年项目《教育资源的优化配置策略研究》。
摘要：
This paper documents the response of the within-household labor supply to the economic uncertainty in China. Using a wave of massive layoffs at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1997 as a natural experiment, we show that the spouses of the household heads who worked at an SOE increased their labor supply following the layoffs significantly more than the spouses of the household heads who did not work at an SOE. We explore two possible explanations for this finding. The precautionary motive seems to largely explain the main effect— though the head of the household was not laid off (“worriers”), the family exhibit less consumption and increase precautionary savings. Suggestively, the substitution effect also drives the main effect as the heads of households who left their positions at SOEs during the layoffs (“leavers”) tend to migrate to jobs that required few skills and paid less.
北大经院工作坊第703场
Political Independence and Financial Stability: Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections During the Progressive Era and Great Depression in the United States
经济史工作坊
主讲人：Gary Richardson (University of California, Irvine)
主持老师：（北大经院）赵一泠、Mark Hup
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色
（北大国发院）席天扬、于航
时间：2023年9月21日（周四）12：00-13：30
地点：北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人简介：
Gary Richardson is a Professor of Economics at the University of California in Irvine. He got his undergraduate degree in political science and history from the University of Chicago and his Ph.D. in economics from UC Berkeley. From 2012 to 2016, he served as the official Historian of the Federal Reserve System.
摘要：
Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. The institutions’ value is illuminated by a Progressive Era policy experiment when independent state-bank regulators came under governors’ supervision. Afterwards, bank resolution rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks supervised by state but not national authorities. This gubernatorial-campaign effect diminished by two orders of magnitude, but did not disappear, after the FDIC became the independent resolver for all insured banks in 1935. In addition, during the Progressive Era, declines in bank resolutions led to declines in business bankruptcy rates, an effect that is not observed in the FDIC era. Our findings indicate regulatory independence can dramatically reduce but may not eliminate politics’ impact on banks and the economy.
The Great Depression illustrates the importance of financial independence. New research indicates that onset of banking panics in the United States in the fall of 1930 occurred in the aftermath of the gubernatorial elections in Tennessee and New York. In these states, regulators suppressed information about weaknesses in critical nodes in the financial network. In days after the election, regulators shut down banks at these critical nodes, triggering counterparty cascades that forced hundreds of financial institutions out of operation and triggering panics among depositors and bankers that spread the crisis to areas far from the regions where the panics began.
北大经院工作坊第704场
Nonparametric Tests for Equality of Conditional Distributions
（条件分布等式的非参数检验？）
计量、金融和大数据分析工作坊
主讲人：Xingyu Li (National School of Development, Peking University)
主持老师：（北大经院）王熙
参与老师：
（北大经院）王一鸣、刘蕴霆、王法
（北大国发院）黄卓、张俊妮、孙振庭
（北大新结构）胡博
时间：2023年9月22日（周五）10：00-11：30
地点：北京大学经济学院107会议室
主讲人简介：
Xingyu Li is currently a Ph.D. student at National School of Development, Peking University. His research fields include theoretical econometrics and applied econometrics.
摘要：
This paper proposes two easy-to-implement nonparametric tests for the equality of two conditional distributions. To avoid estimating conditional density functions, we transform the null hypothesis into an equivalent characterization. Based on two-sample U-process and weak convergence theory, we construct the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Cramér-von Mises (CvM) statistics and find their asymptotic distributions. The critical values are constructed by a multiplier bootstrap method. The proposed KS and CvM tests are proved to be asymptotically size-controlled and consistent against each fixed alternative. A study on the local power of the tests is provided. Monte Carlo experiments illustrate good performance of the tests in finite samples.
北大经院工作坊第705场
Non-Tariff Trade Barriers in the U.S.-China Trade War
（中美贸易战的非关税壁垒）
宏观经济学工作坊
主讲人：陈拓 (清华大学助理教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）李博
参与老师：
（北大国发院）赵波、余昌华、李明浩
（北大经院）陈仪、韩晗、李伦
时间：2023年9月22日（周五）10：00-11：30
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园245教室
主讲人简介：
陈拓，清华大学经管学院经济系助理教授，美国哥伦比亚大学经济学博士。主要研究兴趣在宏观经济学，并运用微观数据研究宏观问题。
摘要：
We use Chinese customs data to show that unofficial non-tariff barriers were responsible for 50\% of the overall reduction in Chinese imports from the U.S. during the height of the U.S.-China trade war in 2018 and 2019. We infer non-tariff barriers from the change in imports of U.S. products relative to imports from other countries of the same HS-6 product, after controlling for the change in the relative price of U.S. imports to the same product sold by other countries. Non-tariff barriers were imposed on a small number of agricultural products, did not apply to state-owned importers, and larger for products with a high share of state importers in total imports. Non-tariff barriers were responsible for more than 90\% of the welfare cost to Chinese consumers of the U.S.-China trade war. The welfare loss to China of a given reduction in imports from the U.S. from non-tariff barriers is about six times larger than an equivalent import decline due to higher tariffs. Non-tariff barriers are more costly compared to tariffs because they applied to some importers and not others, which results in misallocation, and because non-tariff barriers do not generate revenues.
北大经院工作坊第706场
基于气候博弈的激励机制研究
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：张博宇（北京师范大学教授）
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛、吴泽南，石凡奇
（北大国发院）汪浩、胡岠、邢亦青
（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁
时间：2023年9月22日（周五）10：30-12：00
地点：北京大学经济学院302会议室
主讲人简介：
张博宇，北京师范大学数学科学学院，教授、博士生导师，行为与博弈决策实验室主任。2006年和2009年于北京师范大学获学士和硕士学位，2012年于奥地利维也纳大学获博士学位。2012年加入北京师范大学。主要研究方向包括演化博弈和学习模型、激励机制设计、网络博弈、行为实验和行为大数据等。在PNAS，One Earth，Operations Research，Games and Economic Behavior等发表论文50余篇。主持国家自然科学基金重点项目和优秀青年基金等项目。担任Dynamic Games and Applications副主编和多个国际期刊编委。
摘要：
2015年《巴黎协定》在第21届联合国气候变化大会上通过，成为全球气候治理进程中新的里程碑。然而气候协定中的国家自主贡献、资金机制和全球盘点在没有强制的情况下是否有效仍存在争议。本研究基于带阈值的公共品博弈模型，通过均衡分析、演化博弈、行为实验和计算机仿真结合的方法，分析了气候协议中资金机制对合作减排的促进作用。理论和实验结果表明即使在没有强制的情况下，富国也会自愿通过资金机制资助穷国减排，穷国受到激励后也相应提高了减排量，进而达到了减排目标；此外，富国出钱穷国出力的合作减排方式不仅具有更强的演化稳定性，并且还能够帮助提高双方的收益；这些结论对不同的减排周期、减排成本比和气候风险具有鲁棒性。
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：兮哲
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
